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Refugee Family Reunification Rights: A Basis in the
European Court of Human Rights' Family
Reunification Jurisprudence
Mark Rohan*
Abstract
Refugee situationsinevitably lead to the separation offamiliesfleeing a country in which
they are no longer safe. Thus, it may seem surprisingthat the main instruments of international
refugee law make minimal mention of the family as a subject ofprotection. This Comment is
intended to show that regardless of the absence of directfamily rghtsprotectionsfor refugees in
the Convention on the Status of Refugees, various other international instruments in
combination, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in particular, have
established a iight offamily reun/icationfor refugees. The European Court of Human Rights
has developed a balandng test, weighing the state's rght to control its borders against the
family 's interest infamily unit, to determine whetherfamily reunicationis requiredby Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The refugeefulfills this balancing test,given
the necessay implications of refugee status under the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and thefactors upon which the European Court of Human Rights has put weight in
family reunication cases. The substantial similarity between Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights andfamily unity provisions in other human rights instruments
of more general applicationprovides reason to find the European Court of Human Rights is
persuasive in shaping the right to family reumfcation generaly. By relying on the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rzghts rather than more narrowly tailored family
reunificationprovisionsfound in human rights instruments, this Comment will show that the
rght to family reunfication extends to all refugeefamilies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When discussing refugees in international law, scholars and commentators
frequently note that refugees present tension between national sovereignty and
human rights: although states have at least some obligations to refugees as
subjects of international human rights law, it is also a basic tenet of sovereignty
that nations have control over who enters their borders.' The extent of refugees'
rights, then, places a limit on national sovereignty; there are some people
towards whom states have obligations such that the states may not exercise their
rights of national sovereignty to exclude. Frequently, this debate concerns the
refugee him- or herself: under what conditions does a person fulfill the
conditions necessary to place a limit on state sovereignty with respect to their
borders? Much of the relevant case law and most of the relevant treaties on the
subject of refugees have focused on this question. For example, the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees2 and its Protocol3 (together, the Refugee
Convention), the most important documents in defining the rights of refugees in
international law, provide that a refugee' may not be returned to the country
from which he or she has fled.' But, at the same time, the Refugee Convention
provides that a nation need not provide asylum to a person who "has committed
a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge."' The conditions
under which a person obtains refugee status, and the treatment required of states
with respect to such a person, are the main focus of refugee law.
A related but less thoroughly treated topic has been states' obligations to
the refugee's family after refugee status has been granted to that person. The
Refugee Convention, for example, contains only one mention of the family in its

I

See, for example, Gallya Lahav, InternationalVersus National Constraintsin Famiy-Reunifcation Migration
Pogy, 3 GLOBAL GoVERNANCE 349, 349 (1997) (explaining that "states are forced to deal with
competing and contradictory interests: between state obligations to the individual ... versus
competing national interests and fundamental state prerogatives").

2

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter
Refugee Convention].

3

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter
Protocol].

4

Defined in Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(A)(2), as amended by the Protocol, as a
person who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country."

s

Id. art. 33.

6

Id. art. 1(F).
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main text.7 Given that the main instruments of international protection in this
area neglect the family as a subject of protection, it might be argued that states
do not have obligations to either the families of refugees or to the refugee with
respect to his or her family. By expanding the scope of inquiry beyond the
primary instruments of international protection of refugees, examining human
rights instruments' provisions regarding the family and their judicial
interpretation, this Comment seeks to identify a strong basis in human rights
jurisprudence from which to conclude that a right to family unity has been
established such that refugees who have been separated from their families as a
result of their flight for asylum have a right to family reunification. Other
scholars have reached a similar conclusion when examining non-refugee
international instruments,' but this Comment is intended to provide firmer
ground on which to rest the right to family reunification, relying primarily on the
developed jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
This Comment will proceed as follows. Section II will establish the right to
family unity as a general guarantee of international law. Having demonstrated
that there exists a general right to family unity, Section III will examine how this
right is operationalized in international law through an examination of family
reunification issues in general. After a general discussion of refugees in
international law, Section IV will show, relying on the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, that the circumstances under which reunification have
been denied are generally inapplicable to the unique circumstances that
characterize the refugee. Significantly, a refugee is by definition involuntarily
removed from his or her country of origin and therefore not able to avail himor herself of family unity in his or her country of choice. The effect of both of
these propositions is that denial of family unity, while not an absolute violation
of human rights, would likely be a violation of human rights in the refugee
context.
II. THE RIGHT TO FAMILY UNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Section will demonstrate that the right to family unity has been
established through various international instruments and therefore is a right
(albeit of ambiguous content) in international law. This Section is not a
comprehensive or exhaustive review of the available information supporting a
right to family unity; instead, it is intended only to demonstrate that there is such
7

Id. art. 12(2) (requiring contracting states to respect rights attaching to marriage acquired prior to
the person obtaining refugee status).

8

See, for example, Kate Jastram & Kathleen Newland, Family Unity and Refugee Protection, in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTIERNATIONAL LAw 559 (Erika Feller, Volker Tirk & Frances Nicholson eds.,
2003). See also discussion infra, Section III.A.
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a right, evidenced across various instruments of international law. It will also
show, importantly, that the right is expressed across various instruments in a
substantially similar manner. There is general agreement that a right to family
unity exists in international law.' The importance of family unity to refugee
rights has been recognized and explored by other commentators on the
subject." Such a showing is important because refugee protection is not isolated
from human rights law generally: "International refugee protection has shown a
capacity to evolve and develop ... through the contribution of a variety of
international instruments, the work of intergovernmental bodies, including
regional organizations, and jurists.""
A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)12
enshrines the family as "the natural and fundamental group unit of society" such
that it is "entitled to protection by society and the State."l 3 It should be noted
that the UDHR is a non-binding declaration, but it is nevertheless important in
the determination of states' duties. The UDHR "was originally intended to be a
hortatory set of standards," but "many of its provisions have now been accepted
as customary international law."" Therefore, the inclusion of the family's right
to protection by the state in the UDHR is not insignificant; it indicates a general
norm that states are expected to follow when dealing with issues regarding the
family.
States must protect the family through "domestic provisions."'" In practice,
this means that there must be a legal basis for the existence of the family, and
9

10

See Anne Staver, Free Movement and the Fragmentation of Family Reunfication Rights, 15 EUR. J.
MIGRATION & L. 69, 69 (2013) (finding that "the right to family life is widely accepted"); see also
Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of InternationalLaw, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 213, 222-26 (2003) (finding a strong right to family unity, both parental and for children).
See, for example, Jastram & Newland, supra note 8; Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Torture, Family
Reunmfication, and United States Immigration Poliy, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 897, 907 (2005) [hereinafter Forced
to Choose].

"

Bemma Donkoh, A HalfCentuy of International Refugee Protection: Who's Responsible, Whats Ahead?,
18 BERKEILEY J. INT'L L. 260, 263 (2000); see also PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGES:
REFUGEE DEFINITION AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECrION REVISITED 23 (1997) (finding
"essential connections between human rights and the refugee problem").

12

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter U.D.H.R.].

13 Id. art. 16(3).
14

Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 218.

i5

Stephanie Lagoutte & August Thor Arnason, Article 16, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 342 (Gubmundur S. Alfrebsson
& Asbjorn Eide eds., 1999).

Summer 2014

351

ChicagoJournalofInternationallaw

that the state may not interfere with family unity without a legitimate purpose."
Thus, there is both a positive and negative component to the rights established
by Article 16: the state must have laws and processes available to ensure
enjoyment of the family, and it must not prevent enjoyment of the family
without a legitimate overriding objective. As we will see, because the state
objective must be overriding, the balance of interests will vary based on the
situation in which the state and family find themselves.
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are
treaties intended to guarantee certain rights to all people in the political and
economic sphere. The ICCPR" aims to express the "civil and political rights, as
well as [the] economic, social and cultural rights" of every person." Articles 17
and 23 of this instrument jointly establish a right to family life." Article 17
provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his [or her] ... family" and that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference." 20 Article 23 provides that the "family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State." 21 Taken together, these articles obligate states to protect
the family as a fundamental unit of society, recognizing the value of the family as
a means to societal and personal wellbeing.' The right to family unity can be
deduced from the implications of these articles: if states must protect the family
from unlawful interference, then the unity of the family, which exists only in the
absence of unlawful interference, must be a civil right of every person. The
16

Id. at 342-43.

17

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].

1s

Id. at Preamble.

19
20

Staver, supra note 9, at 78 n.45.
ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 17.

21

Id. art. 23.

22

Notably, this proposition has come under significant attack from feminist scholars. Seefor
example,
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1978). Because this Comment will
ultimately only concern itself with involuntary family separation, though, this important criticism is
less forceful than in the general case. The assumption herein is that it is in the best interests of the
refugee family to be reunited, although there are of course cases in which this is not true and there
may even be a further argument that the family is not due the protection granted to it by the
international community. This further argument, though, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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ICESCR,23 a twin document to the ICCPR, provides a particularly strong
endorsement of the principle of family unity. Article 10 of the Covenant states
that the "widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the
family."24 The inclusion of family unity rights in documents setting out the civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights of individuals is telling of its
central importance as a general right, as these treaties address matters of great
significance for the stability and well-being of all persons.
C. Regional Compacts
Various regional compacts have included a right to family life similar to the
rights found in the UDHR and ICCPR. The American Convention on Human
Rights, to which nineteen nations in the western hemisphere, including the US,
are party, includes in Article 17 a provision identical to the one found in the
UDHR.2 5 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well, contains
a provision entitling the family to protection, but further explicitly places duties
upon the state to assist the family.26 Finally, the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR50), the same document that
establishes the European Court of Human Rights, guarantees "respect for ...
family life" by participating states.27 Not only, then, has the family come under
protection of the more general human rights documents, but also those limited
to more specific geographic areas.
D. Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)28 is yet another
important source of information about the state's obligations to the family.
Although on its face it concerns only the rights of the child, this convention has
been influential in shaping the state's obligations to the family because the rights
of the child are intimately bound up with the rights of the family.29 This is
evident in the text of the treaty, which contains extensive reference to the family,
23

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.

24

Id. art. 10(1).

25

American Convention on Human Rights art. 17, Nov. 22,1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.

26

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 18,June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.

27

European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
E.C.H.R.50].
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter C.R.C.].

28
29

See id. at Preamble (noting that the family is "the fundamental group of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children" and that
"the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a
family environment").
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including several provisions relevant to family unity and reunification. Article 9,
a particularly strong expression of the right to family unity inhering in children,
provides that states "shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or
her parents against their will" except when such separation is in the best interest
of the child." Article 10, dealing explicitly with family reunification, requires
states to deal with applications for reunification in a "positive, humane and
expeditious manner,"3 1 limiting the valid reasons for prohibiting exit or entry to
"national security, public order[,] . . . public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others."32 This provision sets a high bar for refusing reunification,
and requires more from the state than passive allowance of immigration for
reunification purposes.
Article 16, echoing the above human rights documents, provides a right for
children to be free from unlawful interference with their family and entitles them
to legal protection from such interference.33 This serves to reinforce the more
general right to family unity, showing that the same type of right applies across
various contexts. Article 22, explicitly concerning refugee children, obligates
states to "trace the parents or other members of the family of any refugee child
in order to obtain information necessary for reunification with his or her
family."34 Thus, in the context of refugee children, there is an explicit duty to
assist in reunification. The CRC, then, is not merely an explication of children's
rights, but also an expression of the rights belonging to the family." There is a
clear policy to keep families unified, in keeping with the right to family unity
expressed in other instruments.
E. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights
of All Migrant Workers and Their Families
Yet another international legal document that enshrines the family as a unit
worthy of protection is the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (Migrant Workers
Convention). 3 Of particular concern is Section III of the Convention, entitled
30

Id.art. 9(1).

31

Id. art. 10(1).

32

Id. art. 10(2).

33
34

Id. art. 16.

35

See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 225 (explaining that Article 3 of the CRC "suggests that
protection of parental rights may permit some departures from the strict application of the best
interests [of the child] standard," therefore implicating rights beyond those held by children).
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their

36

Id. art. 22(2).

Families, Dec. 18,1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Migrant Workers Convention].
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"Human rights of all migrant workers and members of their families," which is
structured in such a way as to suggest that the family is inseparable from the
migrant worker." Article 14 contains a recitation of the migrant worker family's
right to protection from unlawful interference." Going further, though, Article 8
of the Migrant Workers Convention establishes a right of free movement,
including the right of migrant workers and their families to leave any state,
including their country of origin (subject to restrictions based on national
security, public order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others)"
and of migrant workers and their families to return to their country of origin.4
The policy embodied in these rights-expressly granted jointly to the migrant
worker and his or her family-is that the family should be maintained in a single
unit even as the migrant worker is required to transition from nation to nation.
A treaty expressing the rights of migrant workers as such would only have to
establish the right of the migrant worker to move freely; the intended effect of
extending this right to the migrant worker's family is to ensure family unity
during such movement.
The above instruments, though not an exhaustive list of international
documents affirming the unity of the family,4 1 affirm family unity not merely as a
valuable end but also as a right to which the family jointly and its members are
entitled. The right to family unity is not contained in a single document or from
a single international body, but has found clear expression both internationally
and regionally in various instruments, leaving no doubt that the right exists in
some form. States, then, are obligated to take measures to protect the family.
This right could find expression in various means; in itself, the right to family
unity is devoid of content until put into practice by states party to the above
conventions. In the context of immigration, the right to family unity could be
applicable not only to entry by family members but also deportation of a family
member.42 Scholars have argued that states have shown more favorability to
family unity when considering deportation than entry.43 For the purposes of this

37
38
39

Id. at Part III.

40

Id. art. 8(2).

41

See, for example, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 25(2)(b), OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999.
See Maria v. McEly, 68 F.Supp.2d 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding deportation without
consideration of family separation a violation of Articles 23 and 17 of the ICCPR).

42
43

Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 8(1).

See, for example, Lori Nessel, Famies at Risk: How Errant Enforcement and Restrictionist Integration
Policies Threaten the Immigrant Famiy in the European Union and United States, 36 HOFsTRA L. REV.
1271, 1279 (2008) [hereinafter Famiies at Risk].
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Comment, though, the relevant expression of this right is in the practice of
family reunification.
III. FAMILY REUNIFICATION GENERALLY
Family reunification is not only a refugee issue. There are many
circumstances under which families can be separated among different nations
and seek to be brought together again. Family reunification, for example, is a
prominent issue among migrant workers." Therefore, in order to understand the
broader issues of family reunification, we must examine international documents
and jurisprudence in contexts beyond refugee situations. A review of the
relevant law will show that it is not at all clear that the right to family unity
implies a right to family reunification. For example, if a person voluntarily
immigrates and then applies for family reunification in the state in which he or
she has chosen to reside, the state could argue that denial of family reunification
is compatible with the right to family unity because there is a viable alternative
country in which the family can be united. Examining the law and practice of
family reunification generally will clarify the circumstances under which family
reunification has been deemed necessary or unavailable to applicants. This in
turn will shed light on the implementation of family rights in refugee situations.
While the preceding Section showed that human rights documents create
rights in family unity, this Section will examine the specific expression of the
right to family unity through family reunification. Although family reunification
is undoubtedly a possible means of protecting the family, it is a means that
implicates "additional dimensions, including whether an immigrant's crossing of
transnational borders to join a family member in the host state, or allowing an
immigrant to remain in the host state's territory so as not to sever an existing
family unit, should be permitted."4 5 Because family reunification is a matter of
immigration, it involves a similar tension to that found in refugee law between
national prerogatives in controlling borders and international human rights
principles. As a result, "[f]amilies have had mixed results when utilizing
international human rights instruments to argue for family reunification or
family unity in the immigration context."4 6 This Section will therefore examine
the results of legal challenges to a state's denial of family reunification. Although
a brief note of state practice4 7 more generally will be made, the most illuminating
44

See Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 36, art. 44 (obligating states-party to facilitate family
reunification).

45

Nessel, Familiesat Risk, supra note 43, at 1277.
Id. at 1279.

46
47

See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 229 ("Customary international law, which
binds all states,
derives from two elements: state practice and opiniojuis.").
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sources of law, on which this Comment will most extensively rely, will be those
in which the legal rule regarding reunification is made explicit. Therefore, judicial
opinions are of great weight in providing an outline of the right to family
reunification.48
A. Relevant Treaty Provisions
Although several of the treaties relevant to family reunification have been
listed above, it is worth identifying, without being overly duplicative, those
treaties that specifically provide for family reunification, rather than affirming
only the more broad principle of the unity of the family. The treaties below go
beyond recognizing a right to family unity but further implement a specific result
of such a right.
Article 44 of the Migrant Workers Convention obligates states party to
"take measures they deem appropriate and that fall within their competence to
facilitate the reunification of migrant workers with their spouses." 49 This
provision leaves considerable leeway for the state to determine what measures
are appropriate. For example, one scholar notes that while states sometimes
grant temporary visa holders family reunification, they "generally have not done
so for the undocumented."" Thus, it is clear that states do not forfeit rights to
control their borders in the case of migrant workers, especially those that are
undocumented. The right to family reunification under the appropriateness
standard is therefore limited by prerogatives of national policy, such as
immigration control.
The requirements of the CRC are somewhat more stringent. Article 10 of
that document requires states to deal with applications by a child for parents to
enter and leave a country in a "positive, humane, and expeditious manner.""
This has been called an "innovative obligation,"5 2 "arguably giving rise to a right
to enter a foreign country."5 3 A clause requiring positive action on behalf of the
state alters the traditional balance between state sovereignty and human rights,
placing a higher burden on the state to show that it has a legitimate reason for
4s

See id. at 230 (explaining that the modem view of customary international law places primary
weight on opiniojuris, "which can be inferred from court decisions, declarations of international
forums, and the content of treaties that have been ratified by a large number of states").

49

Migrant Workers Convention, supranote 36, art. 44.

50

Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democraies Value Famiy and Marriage?:Immigration Law's
ConflictedAnswers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 277 (2004).

51

C.R.C., supra note 28, art. 10.

52

SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVI-NnON ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD 189 (1999).

s3

Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 224 (discussing DETRICK, supra note 52).
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exclusion. This is a stark change from the status quo, in which states need not
articulate or even have a reason for denying an applicant entry into their
borders.5 4 That said, the CRC leaves the specific implementation of that positive
obligation to the state's discretion. The language of the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child provides a more stern and clear requirement:
states party "shall take all necessary measures to re-unite children with parents or
relatives where separation is caused by internal or external displacement arising
from armed conflicts or natural disasters."" Although it is limited in persuasive
power, as a regional instrument, this Charter provides a vision of a strict right to
family reunification.
Given the strong expressions of family reunification rights in some
international instruments, it might be argued that a general right has been
established without further exploration of the right to family unity. In
concluding that there is a general right to family reunification under international
law, Kate Jastram and Kathleen Newland provide the CRC as the primary basis
for the establishment of the right." This basis is unsatisfactory for a general
right, though, because it does not implicate the concept of family generally as the
subject of the right, but rather the unique circumstances of the child. Thus, this
right emerges not from the right to family unity, but rather through concern for
children in particular. As such, there are many refugee families that might escape
a right justified on such narrow ground; families without children, families with
children over the age of majority, and families with dependent elders, for
example, would not be able to avail themselves of the right to family
reunification derived from the CRC." Jastram and Newland are conscious of
this limitation, finding the CRC sufficient "at least for reunification of
unaccompanied/separated children and their parents."" To find a right to family
reunification for all refugee families, then, this Comment will proceed to find a
more satisfying basis in the interpretations of more general provisions of
international human rights treaties.

54

Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 224.

55

African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, supranote 41, art. 25(2)(b).
Jastram & Newland, supra note 8, at 577 (finding that "the core of the right to family reunification
in international human rights law is found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child";
referencing the European Court of Human Rights, Jastram and Newland find that the Court
"leaves an opening" for refugees).
With respect to majority-aged children and dependent elders, it is not necessarily the case that a
state will recognize such families as eligible for reunification, even under a more general basis.
Which families are eligible will likely be a matter of domestic policy. That said, a broader right
rooted in the family itself is important to make uncontroversial spouse-only reunifications
possible, and more expansive reunifications even arguable.
Id. at 579.

56

57

s8
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At present, then, although several human rights instruments reference
family reunification directly, it appears that none in isolation establishes a general
right for refugees that decisively trumps the state's right to control its borders.
B. European Court of Human Rights
The most abundant source of law on family reunification comes from the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR). This
Section will examine some of the leading decisions on family reunification in the
European Union, using the rationales provided in these cases, insofar as they are
interpretations of the relevant legal documents, to present a clearer picture of
family reunification's status in international law. These cases are especially
helpful because they represent much of the developed doctrine regarding family
reunification, and the treaties are either of international application or are so
substantially similar to those with international application that the reasoning is
persuasive nonetheless."
It is necessary to note, as an initial matter, that the ECtHR distinguishes
between two types of cases regarding the interference with family and private
life: entry into a country by non-citizens to join a person lawfully residing in that
countryo (the family reunification context) and removal of a person from a
country in which he or she already has a family (the deportation context).6 1
Because the former is the only context strictly relevant to family reunification, an
in-depth analysis of the latter cases is not necessary here. Notably, though, the
ECtHR places a higher burden on states deporting a person than on those
denying entry. 62 Although with respect to the right to family unity, the difference
between deportation and entry may be more formalistic than substantive, the
Court has more readily conceived of deportation as interference within the
meaning of Article 8 of the European Charter of Human Rights.
1. Abdula#7, Cabales, and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom.
The ECtHR decided the first of the important family reunification cases in
1985. Abdulazi7 Cabales, and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom64 came before the
Court after three women applied for family reunification so their husbands
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Compare ECHR50, supra note 27, art. 8 with ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 17 and UDHR, supra note
12, art. 16.
Seefor example, Nsona v. the Netherlands, App. No. 23366/94, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 9 (2001).

61

Seefor example, Berrehab v. the Netherlands, App. No. 10730/84, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 (1988).
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Helene Lambert, The European Courtof Human Rights and the Right of Refugees and Other Persons in Need
of Famiy Protection, 11 INT'I.J. REFUGEE L. 427, 440-41 (1999).
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Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 17 (1985).
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could join them in the UK Despite the fact that the women were lawfully and
permanently settled in the UK, their applications for reunification were
rejected." The applicants then filed a complaint alleging that the refusal to allow
their spouses to join them permanently in the UK amounted to a violation of
the European Convention of Human Rights, which guarantees non-interference
with the family." The Court accepted the argument that Article 8 applied to
immigration, stating that "immigration controls had to be exercised consistently
with Convention obligations, and the exclusion of a person from a State where
members of his family were living might raise an issue under Article 8.""
Importantly, the Court noted that it was not the rights of those being refused
entry that would be violated, but those applying for entry." Moreover, the Court
found that Article 8's non-interference language may include "positive
obligations inherent in an effective 'respect' for family life" although nations are
given a "wide margin of appreciation" in putting the article into effect, such that
the state's obligation varies from case to case." That being the case, the court
found that a denial of reunification did not violate Article 8 because the
applicants failed to show that there were obstacles to establishing family life in
their own or their husbands' home countries.7 0 As the Court stated: "The duty
imposed by Article 8 (art. 8) cannot be considered as extending to a general
obligation on the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice by married
couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the nonnational spouses for settlement in that country." '
Thus, the legal standard established in Abdula-ig was that, for a violation of
Article 8 to exist where reunification is denied, (1) there needs to be an existing
or intended family life; and (2) there must be obstacles preventing establishment
of family life in another country. This standard is applied, though, with
deference to state decisions regarding their borders, effectively establishing a
balancing test under which the state's aims in excluding the applicant are
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Id. 110.
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Id. 58.
Id 59.
Id. 60:
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The applicants are not the husbands but the wives, and they are complaining
not of being refused leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but, as
persons lawfully settled in that country, of being deprived (Mrs. Cabales), or
threatened with deprivation (Mrs. Abdulaziz and Mrs. Balkandali), of the
society of their spouses there.
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weighed against the level of difficulty faced by the applicant in returning to his
or her own or her spouse's country of origin.72
2. Gil v. Swit.erland.
The ECtHR heard its next significant case concerning family reunification,
Gil v. SwitZerland,73 in 1996. In that case, a mother and father living in
Switzerland (the father because he had fled his home country of Turkey for
political reasons and the mother because she was granted a humanitarian visa to
get treatment there for her severe epilepsy) applied for reunification with their
son, living in Turkey.74 When the application was denied, the parents complained
that such denial violated their rights under Article 8 of the ECHR50." Following
the lead of AbdulaZir, the court again stated that although Article 8 places
positive obligations on the state (that is, it does not merely protect families from
interference by the state but also requires the state to take action to correct for
disturbances of family unity), Article 8 does so with a margin of appreciation,
allowing the state to balance the interests of the individual against that of the
community." Because a genuine family life was in existence, the Court asked "to
what extent it is true that Ersin's move to Switzerland would be the only way for
Mr Giil to develop family life with his son."" The Court found that insufficient
obstacles had been shown: Mr. Gill was unable to prove in the first instance that
he was a political refugee, and had visited his son in Turkey in recent years; Mrs.
Gill failed to show that sufficient medical care could not be found in Turkey.7
Therefore, having failed to show that the second prong of the above legal
standard was fulfilled, the Giils were denied a remedy under the right to family
life.79
3. Ahmut v. the Netherlands.
The ECtHR considered another family reunification case, Ahmut v. the
Netherlands," that same year. In this case, a father applied to be reunified with his
nine-year-old child after the child's mother died in Morocco, the child's country
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Lambert, .rupranote 62, at 440-41.
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Gi v. Switzerland, App. No. 23218/94, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 93 (1996).
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Id. 116-10.
Id.T 28.
Id. T 38.
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Id. 39.
Id. 41.
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Id. 42 (although "it would admittedly not be easy for them to return to Turkey, there are, strictly
speaking, no obstacles preventing them from developing family life in Turkey.").
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of origin."' Although the child was initially cared for by his grandmother, she fell
ill and was no longer able to care for him, prompting the reunification
application.82 As in the above cases, the state rejected the application, leading to
a complaint on Article 8 grounds." The Court once again disagreed, finding no
violation of the right to family unity found in the European Convention of
Human Rights.84 The Court emphasized the fact that Ahmut had chosen to live
in the Netherlands, away from his son, and therefore denial of family
reunification would not change the status of their family unity at all." (The
Court ignored, perhaps unfairly, that Ahmut had since remarried in the
Netherlands, and now had a wife and three stepchildren.)" Therefore, when
balancing the parties' interests, the Court found insufficient reason to conclude
that Ahmut's interests outweighed those of the state in controlling immigration.
Moreover, the court noted that the child had strong links, including family
relations, still residing in Morocco."
Although the Court in Gil and Ahmut ostensibly applied the same legal
standard that was expressed in Abdula#i, critics have viewed these cases as a
"narrowing of the right to family reunification."" The Gil and Ahmut decisions
imply that, in order for a person to successfully appeal a rejection of family
reunification, it must be impossible or at least extremely difficult for them to
continue elsewhere the family relation they experienced prior to migration. Not
only does this impose a high "obstacle" requirement, but it further requires that
the obstacle not be one the migrant would have or in fact did accept when
migrating.
These decisions give content to the right to family unity, important
particularly because legal clarification of the right's scope and contours is
conspicuously absent outside what little can be gleaned from state practice." The
legal standard that appears gives states wide latitude in deciding who will enter
81

Id. f 7-11.
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Id. 11 17, 21.
Id. 159.
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Id.173.
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Id.
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Id 169.
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Fatima Kahn, Reunification of the Refugee Famil in South Africa: A Forgotten Human Right?, 28 Ri FUGE
77, 82 (2011); see also Nessel, Forcedto Choose, supra note 10, at 912 (criticizing the European Court
of Human Rights' "narrow[ I framing" of the case); Demleitner, supra note 50, at 288 (noting that
Abmut followed Gils interpretation of the AbdulaiZA balancing test, despite strong dissents).

89

See Section III.C below.

70 ("Salah Ahmut is not prevented from maintaining the degree of family life which he
himself had opted for when moving to the Netherlands in the first place, nor is there any obstacle
to his returning to Morocco.").
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their borders, with the exception of those who have no other means of
establishing or continuing a family life elsewhere.
C. State Practice
Scholars have identified some general trends from the available
information about state practice with respect to family reunification. In the US
in particular, family reunification is the main form of immigration: "in 2002,
63.3[ percent] of the immigrants admitted to the United States were admitted
based on family ties."" More recently, "in 2011, four out of five immigrants

given green cards established their eligibility as family members of US citizens or
lawful permanent residents."" Thus, in the US, family reunification is the norm
rather than the exception. The US is the world leader in percentage of
immigrants entering via family reunification, though.9 2 Across the twenty-four
countries surveyed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, there appeared no general policy or trend with respect to family
reunification, with the number of family reunification immigrants as a
percentage of the total immigrant population ranging from Denmark's 7.4
percent to Korea's 54.2 percent (excluding the United States' aforementioned
percentage).93 Therefore, there appears to be no general state practice with
respect to family reunification.94 Moreover, even if a trend could be identified,
without more information we cannot know whether this practice is merely
national policy or in response to international norms.
Given the above, it is clear that there is no general right to family
reunification in international law: the states retain the right, in the usual case, to
deport or exclude persons seeking residence in their country. This has been the
conclusion of scholars examining the subject.95 Despite the lack of a general
right, though, the right to family reunification exists in the more specific
circumstances of the scattered refugee family.
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Nessel, Forced to Choose, supra note 10, at 934-35.
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Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Famiy 5,eial, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 7,7 (2013).
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Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, InternationalMigration Outlook 2013,
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93

Id.

94

See Jastram & Newland, supra note 8, at 592 (reviewing various state reunification frameworks and
practices).
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See Staver, supra note 9, at 78 (observing that "there is no general right to family reunification in
international law"); see also Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 215 (referring to the "glimmerings"
of a customary norm against family separation).
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IV. FAMILY REUNIFICATION IN THE REFUGEE CONTEXT
A. Refugee Law Generally
This Section will provide a brief overview of refugees and refugee law
generally, and then demonstrate that the unique circumstances in which refugees
find themselves remove the strongest legal justification for the denial of family
reunification. Placing the refugee in context as a legal entity, combining refugee
law generally with the aforementioned humanitarian principles and human rights
law as expressed in the European Court of Human Rights, will show that the
refugee's family reunification claim (barring countervailing circumstances such as
a criminal activity by a family member) activates the state's positive obligation to
uphold the principle of family unity regardless of the state's traditional role in
controlling its borders.
1. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention) and its Protocol.
The Refugee Convention," entered into force in 1951, was created as a
means of guaranteeing rights to refugees; the refugee problem was a natural
candidate for resolution by international law rather than national legislation
because it required states to undertake obligations to non-nationals outside of
the immigration context." The major protection granted to refugees under the
Refugee Convention is non-refoulement: the principle that "no refugee should
be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution, other illtreatment, or torture."98 The principle of non-refoulement, then, acts as a
constraint on the sovereign rights of the state to choose who enters its borders:
a refugee who enters its borders cannot be expelled like any other entrant, even
if their entry is illegal, but must be dealt with according to the Refugee
Convention."
The Refugee Convention and its Protocol'
provide the relevant
definitions and manner in which states party must handle refugee situations.
Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, as modified by the Protocol, defines the
term "refugee:" "the term 'refugee' shall apply to any person who . . . owing to a

well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
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Refugee Convention, supra note 2.

97

Donkoh, supra note 11, at 261.
Guy S. GooDwIN-GiL &JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 201 (2007).
Tom Clark, Rights Based Refuge, the Potendal of the 1951 Convention, and the Need for an Authoritative
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Interpretation,16 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 584, 587 (2003).
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Protocol, supra note 3.
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membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country." 0 ' A person who has fulfilled this
definition, then, may not be expelled or returned to his or her home country.' 0 2
The state must then grant the refugee in its territory certain rights of equal
treatment, as provided in various sections of the Refugee Convention."o0 While
family rights are not mentioned specifically in the Refugee Convention, it is
important to observe that the instrument exists to confer refugee status, and
therefore legal recognition of a situation of particular hardship towards which
states must be sensitive, and that it is not the case that the Refugee Convention
is exhaustive of the rights due to a refugee.'0 4
2. The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.
The Refugee Convention provides only broad strokes, containing
"significant gaps and ambiguities," and is therefore insufficient in itself to ensure
refugee protection."o Thus, the Refugee Convention also stipulated that states
party to the instrument cooperate with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the international body entrusted with supervising the
application of the provisions of the Refugee Convention.' UNHCR is unable
to bind states to its judgments and interpretations, as the Refugee Convention
requires only that they "undertake to co-operate" with UNHCR, but the
organization carnes considerable weight in ensuring effectiveness and refugee
protection.' The UNHCR is therefore at least partially responsible for the
"development of international refugee law and . . . ensuring the effectiveness of
international refugee law."108

3. Other human rights instruments.
The main sources of international refugee law, then, are twofold: the
Refugee Convention provides the "comprehensive provisions pertaining to the
legal status and rights as well as basic standards of treatment applicable to

101 Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
102 Id. arts. 32, 33.
103

See,for example, id., art. 22 (requiring states to provide equal treatment with respect to education).

104 Id. art. 5 ("Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted
by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention.").
105

CORINNE LEWIs, UNHCR AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 37 (2012).

106 Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 35.
107

LEWIS, supra note 105, at 43.

108

Id. at 47. See also id., Chapter 5.
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refugees,"' while UNHCR acts as a guide for further development and
refinement of those provisions."o That said, the Refugee Convention and
UNHCR are not the only sources of international refugee law. Although
originally conceived as separate areas of law, "this separation has gradually given
way to a realization of the essential connections between human rights and the
refugee problem.""' Therefore, refugee protection gains meaning, and refugees
themselves gain protection "through the contribution of a variety of
international instruments, the work of intergovernmental bodies, including
regional organizations, and jurists."" 2
The interrelation of some international instruments with refugee protection
is obvious. For example, the CRC, Article 22, provides that refugee children
must be given protection commensurate with the standard set forth in the CRC
as well as other human rights documents, and provides more robust family
reunification rights than are found in the text of the Refugee Convention. 3 The
supplementary refugee protection in such cases is obvious. Even where refugees
are not explicitly mentioned, human rights documents alter states' obligations
consistently with the Refugee Convention. This is supported as a matter of
treaty interpretation by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties." 4 Article
31 provides that interpretation of a treaty is not limited to its text."' This
provision means that "account shall also be taken of any subsequent agreement
between the parties, or any subsequent practice bearing on the interpretation of
the treaty, as well as 'any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties."" The rights accorded to refugees in the treaty,
then, are not exclusive of other rights possessed by refugees as subjects of
human rights law. That is, the failure of Refugee Convention to provide for one
right or another does not mean that such right is not available to refugees if it is
granted in a separate agreement.
Therefore, when determining the rights of the refugee generally, there are
three sources of authority: first, the text of the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and its Protocol; second, the interpretations and guidelines
1o9 KOURULA, supra note 11, at 37.
110 Beyond its legal importance, it should also be mentioned that UNHCR also serves to provide

assistance to refugees in need. As of 2000, UNHCR was "providing protection and assistance to
at least twenty-two million people in 124 countries." Donkoh, supranote 11, at 263.
I

KOURUIA, supra note 11, at 23.

112
113

Donkoh, supra note 11, at 263.
C.R.C., supra note 28, art. 23.

114

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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Id. art. 31.
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promulgated by UNHCR in its official capacity as supervisor of Refugee
Convention's implementation; and finally human rights instruments that
otherwise grant rights to refugees. Drawing on all three sources to determine the
extent of the refugee's right to family reunification indicates that although there
may be no general right to family reunification in international law, considerable
evidence supports the existence of a right to family reunification for refugees.
B. The Refugee and the Family
1. Family unity and the refugee situation.
The situation of the refugee is not merely a matter of great suffering and
stress for the refugee, who is necessarily outside his or her home country out of
fear for his or her safety or well-being, but also affects the refugee's family. "An
almost universal consequence of refugee experiences is the destruction of the
family unit.""' Refugee situations are born of strife and conflict. Some of the
most infamous incidents in recent memory, from the ethnic cleansing in Rwanda
to the conflicts in Kosovo to the invasion of Iraq, have been the cause of
considerable outflow of asylum seekers."' The Refugee Convention itself was
intended to be a temporary response to the scattering of peoples after World
War II, and its application was extended through its Protocol after recognition
that its protections were needed to cope with situations entirely separate from
World War II but with the same tragic effects, namely displacement and
persecution.11 '
Such displacement and persecution forces families to scatter and seek
shelter elsewhere, activating their rights under the Refugee Convention, and
other relevant human rights law, in the process. As a result, it is often only one
member of a family who finds shelter in a country outside the country of
origin.120 In such a case, it is cold comfort to find protection from persecution
only to be left alone and without one's family, worsening the refugee's situation:
not only has becoming a refugee cast him or her out of the home country, but it

117

Brooke Wilmsen, Famiy Separation: The Policies, Procedures, and Consequences for Refugee Background
Families, 30 REFUGEE SURVEY QUARTERLY 44, 63 (2011).

118 See, for example, M.R. ALBORZI, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAW: THE PROTECTION OF IRAQI REFUGEES (2006).
19
120

Donkoh, supra note 11, at 262.
See Jastram & Newland, supra note 8, at 559:
It is common knowledge ... that because they lack legal means to enter many
countries of asylum, many husbands ... will leave their wives and children at
home or in a country of first asylum in order to attempt the journey alone. If
they are stopped in transit[, t]he families concerned are usually left in desperate
straits.
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has also deprived him or her of the enjoyment of family life. Refugees are
especially susceptible to such a fate precisely because becoming a refugee
involves a flight from danger: in such a situation, separation is often the safest
path from persecution and danger, especially when only one family member is
subject to persecution. The issues of family unity and refugee protection, then,
are not merely intertwined by coincidence but by the very necessities of the
refugee situation. The pain of separation is compounded by the fact that
integration into the country of refuge is made much harder by the absence of
family support.' 1 Thus, the principle of family unity is implicated in refugee
situations by the unique features of the refugee.
2. The refugee's legal right to family unity and reunification.
a) The Vienna Convention and non-Refugee Convention refugee rights.
This Section will expand upon Sections II and III, arguing that the legal
principles and standards explicated therein indicate that there is a right to family
reunification in the refugee context. Absent countervailing circumstances, such
as a family member of the applicant being a serious non-political criminal in the
country of origin, the state is under a positive obligation to allow the applicant's
family members to enter the country of refuge for purposes of family
reunification.
First, it must be pointed out that the main text of the Refugee Convention
lacks any provision relating to a right to family unity or reunification. Thus, it
might be argued that the state cannot have positive obligations to a refugee with
respect to family, because the statute providing the ostensibly comprehensive
protection to refugees omits the family entirely. This argument is misguided,
though.
As an initial matter, although there is no mention of the principle of family
unity in the main text of the Refugee Convention, the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries, in adopting the treaty, unanimously chose to include a
Recommendation regarding the principle of the unity of the family.'22 The
Recommendation recognized family unity as "an essential right of the refugee,"
noting that "the rights granted to a refugee are extended to members of his
family" and thereby recommending that states take "necessary measures for the
protection of the refugee's family."' 23 Although the Recommendation is nonbinding,'24 it is evidence of the purpose of the treaty, which is not insignificant

121

Seegenerall Wilmsen, supra note 117.
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Refugee Convention, supra note 2, Recommendation B.
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under the Vienna Convention, if the meaning of the treaty is "ambiguous or
obscure."l 2 5
Second, the absence of explicit mention of rights in the Refugee
Convention does not foreclose the existence of those rights. Once again, the
Vienna Convention is instructive: Article 31 provides that subsequent
agreements provide context for the purpose of the treaty.126 Thus, agreements
such as the ICCPR, the CRC, and others discussed in Section 11 above affect the
way in which we must understand the obligations undertaken by parties to the
Refugee Convention. Because each of these human rights documents includes a
right to family unity, we cannot interpret the Refugee Convention as excluding
such a right. This would, in effect, mean that refugees are due fewer human
rights than non-refugees (because, as the argument would go, refugees are due
only rights granted to them under the Refugee Convention and not, say, the
ICCPR). Such an interpretation would not only ignore the context of subsequent
agreements unequivocally expressing a right to family unity, but would
contravene the pervasive principle of equality of treatment contained in the very
text of the Refugee Convention.'2 7 Finally, Article 5 of the Refugee Convention
provides that "[n]othing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights
and benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this
Convention."128
Further, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, in the
UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, has found that Recommendation B grants refugees rights to family
unity.'29 Therein, the UNHCR provides that "the minimum requirement [for

125

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 114, art. 32. Although not pressed here,
because it is not necessary but rather supplementary to this Comment's conclusion, it is open to
argument that Article 12(2) of the Refugee Convention, supra note 2, which guarantees that
"[rlights previously acquired by a refugee and dependent on personal status, more particularly
rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected by a Contracting State," is ambiguous with respect
to the right to family unity and requires supplementary tools such as Recommendation B as a
means of interpretation.
126 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 114, art. 31(2).
127 See, for example, Refugee Convention, supra note 2, arts. 4 (guaranteeing treatment "at least as
favourable as that accorded to nationals" with respect to religion), 13 (guaranteeing treatment "as
favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally
in the same circumstances" with respect to property), 16 (guaranteeing refugees equal access to
courts).
128

Id. art. 5.

129 See United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 1967 ProtocolRelating to the Status of Refugees,
ch. VI, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 [hereinafter U.N.H.C.R. Handbook].
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benefits of the principle of family unity] is the inclusion of the spouse or minor
children."' Thus, the official organ of the United Nations, with whom the
parties to the Refugee Convention agreed to cooperate in implementation, has
clearly endorsed the principle of family unity for refugees. As a result, when one
or more members of a family have become a refugee, the entire family benefits
from the principle of family unity.' 3 1
Despite the Refugee Convention's silence on the subject, the refugee
family does not lack for rights to family unity. Because Section III showed
clearly that no general right to family reunification exists, though, it must be
demonstrated that the refugee fits into a narrow exception to the general rule
that family reunification is not a right.
b) Application of ECtHRjuri.prudenceto the refugee context.
Given the contours of the right to family reunification explicated in the
European Court of Human Rights decisions, we can expect that refugees, by
virtue of being refugees, are entitled to family reunification generally. In the
cases of Abdulaui*, the Court upheld the state's reunification denial primarily
because the parties were effectively choosing between two states in which they
would reside after marriage.' 32 This rationale is inapplicable to the case of
refugees. A refugee is necessarily outside of his or her country against his or her
will.' 33 Therefore, it is not the case that the refugee is merely choosing to live in a
state in which he or she would prefer to experience family life; instead, the
refugee is forced to be in the country of refuge and is by necessity not in the
country of choice, in contrast to the plaintiffs in Abdulagis. Thus, the rationale
for finding a balance in favor of the state's control over its borders given in that
case is not persuasive when applied to the refugee.
A finding that Abdulaui* is inapplicable to the refugee situation is not
sufficient to show a right to family reunification, though, because the standard
was twice narrowed after that ruling. The subsequent narrowing of the Abdulaig
holding, however, has similarly not foreclosed the refugee's right to family
reunification.
First, in Guil v. Switzerland, recall that the Court found the question of
reunification turned on to what extent family life was impossible absent family
reunification.134 In finding that family life in Turkey was indeed possible, the
Court put weight on the fact that Mr. Giil failed to receive refugee status in
130 Id.

185.

131 Id.

186.

132

133

Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali, spra note 64,
Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.

68.

134 Gil v. Switzerland, supra note 73, $ 39.
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Switzerland based on his treatment in Turkey."' The implication, of course, is
that had Mr. Gi been deemed a refugee, he would have been eligible for family
reunification: the finding that he was not a refugee means, legally, that he is able
to return to Turkey or is not legitimately afraid for his safety there. In accord
with the Refugee Convention,136 Mr. Gi's trips to Turkey weighed heavily
against him."' For a bona fide refugee, neither of these findings would be
available: first of all, the applicant is, by stipulation, a refugee; and second, in
virtue of being a refugee, it is necessary that the applicant could not or would
not visit his or her home country. This is because, of course, the refugee by
definition has great obstacles in his or her way from enjoying family life in the
country of origin. Thus, the "obstacle" requirement expressed in Gill v.
SwitZerland, even as a stricter requirement than that found in Abdulai, is
necessarily met by the refugee.
The final narrowing of reunification rights came in Abmut v. the Netherlands.
In this case, the deciding factor during the Court's usual balancing test was the
fact that Ahmut had made a conscious decision to live apart from his child, and
was therefore ineligible for protection under Article 8 because maintenance of
the status quo, as willingly entered into by the applicant, was not seen as
interference."' It was crucial that Ahmut had opted for a relation of family life,
that is, separation, that a denial of family reunification would not abrogate.'3 9
The Court noted that the principle of family unity does not guarantee a right to
choose the most suitable place to develop a family life,140 implying that the
principle of family unity does guarantee that there will be at least some viable
place to develop a family life. Again, the refugee necessarily fills the exception
traced in Ahmut. Crucially, the refugee is in the country of refuge unwillingly: it is
a basic and necessary fact that refugees are in flight from their homes, not, like
Ahmut, simply choosing to live in a place they deem more suitable. Moreover, it
would be unthinkable that the refugee's being apart from his or her family is
somehow an acceptable status quo into which the refugee entered willingly; the
refugee is and should be an exceptional status, and therefore denying family
reunification would indeed upset the status quo (that is, the enjoyment of family
unity, as it was prior to the attainment of refugee status). Therefore, the Ahmut
case does not provide any rationale for denying family reunification to refugees.
135

Id. 141.
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Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(C)(1) (denying refugee status to those who have
voluntarily re-availed themselves of the protection of their home country).
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Gil v. SwitZerland, supranote 73,
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Ahmut v. the Netherlands, supra note 80,
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Id
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Id. T 71.
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The refugee, then, fulfills the strict test for family reunification set out in
the above three cases by virtue of his or her refugee status. Although the Court
states that "extent of a State's obligation to admit to its territory relatives of
settled immigrants will vary according to the particular circumstances of the
persons involved and the general interest,"14 1 the refugee is a special case who
carries "particular circumstances" with him or her by definition. Those particular
circumstances, a euphemism when applied to refugees, are an inability, against
his or her will, to carry on family life in the country of origin because of
significant barriers to return. In such a case, the ECtHR's jurisprudence on
family reunification counsels in favor of family reunification. Although the
Court endorses a balancing test, the interest in the state controlling its borders
are outweighed by the impossibility of enjoying a widely recognized human right
(that is, to family unity) anywhere but the country of refuge.
In the ECtHR cases explored above, in other words, the balancing test
invariably weighed the ability of the family to enjoy family unity in another area
against the right of the state to police its borders and admit or deny entry as it
pleases. If the state could legitimately deny entry to anyone, in any situation, then
it would be mysterious as to how the ECtHR's test was a balancing test at all: the
state would need merely to invoke the right to control its borders, and the
applicant's claim would be trumped automatically. Clearly, this is not how the
balancing test works, and there must be some situations in which a country's
interests in controlling its borders are overridden by the interests of the family
seeking reunification. It is at this point that the Refugee Convention becomes
important: having been granted legal status as a refugee, the applicant is legally
recognized as not having a home country in which family unity can be enjoyed.
The voluntariness of family separation has been yet another concern in the
ECtHR balancing test, but similarly to the argument given above, the refugee is
necessarily separated from his or her family involuntarily. In such a case, in
which the state's interest is balanced against the interests of a family completely
unable to enjoy family unity elsewhere, it seems as though granting family
reunification is the only logical option if the balancing test is to maintain its
character as a balancing test at all. If the state could invoke its right to control its
borders in any case involving immigration, then the ECtHR jurisprudence would
quite simply have not developed a balancing test at all, despite its own
characterization and the overall operation of the cases involving family
reunification. Therefore, under the balancing test developed by the ECtHR, the
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67.
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individual's status as a refugee is critical to ensuring that family reunification is
categorically granted, all other things being equal.'42
This Comment has assumed that the European Court of Human Rights'
jurisprudence on the right to family reunification is persuasive or instructive in
shaping the right worldwide. This is because the Court is a major institution in
international human rights law and is interpreting a provision of a human rights
document (Article 8 of ECHR50) that, although contained in a regional
compact, is substantially similar to those found in international human rights
instruments. 143 Thus, it is reasonable to argue that although ECtHR's judgments
are not binding precedent for other international or national courts outside
states party to the ECHR50, that such judicial bodies as well as other institutions
implementing policy with respect to refugees will find its reasoning persuasive
when interpreting similar provisions of international human rights treaties. This
assumption is useful, moreover, because of the dearth of jurisprudence regarding
family reunification elsewhere. Putting weight on the European Court of Human
Rights' decisions assumes that their conclusions are substantially similar to those
other judicial bodies would reach. Although state practice is instructive as to the
development of customary norms in international law,'" and there is reason to
believe that state practice in the most influential nations with respect to
immigration favors family reunification,'4 5 it has been discounted it here because

142

143

144
145

That is, assuming that some other state prominent interest is not activated. For example, if a
member of the family with which the refugee is seeking reunification is a known terrorist or war
criminal, thereby implicating the state's right to protect public health and security, it would not be
the case that reunification is necessarily the correct outcome. This is not problematic, though,
because it does not implicate the same rights and balancing test as the usual case and is therefore
an entirely separate issue from the one discussed above.
See BERTRAND G. RAMARCHAN, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY LAW 173-75 (2011) (arguing that all human rights treaties in United Nations system be
interpreted with a "dimension of universality" reflecting their intimate connection with the
UDHR); see alsoJ.G. MERRILIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (1988) (arguing that the decisions of the E.C.t.H.R. have
significance for substantive human rights law, especially where there is overlap in treaty
provisions); Allen E. Shoenberger, Messages from Strasbourg: Lessons for American Courts from the
Highest Volume Human Rights Court in the World-The European Court of Human Rghts, 27 WHITrER
L. REv. 357, 357 (2005) (noting the United States Supreme Court's citation to E.C.t.H.R. in
Lawrence v. Texas).
See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 228-29.
See GOODWIN-GiL & MCADAM, supra note 98, at 148
[1]n assessing the legal weight to be attached to such practice [establishing
interpretive guides] in international law, it is relevant to consider ... which
States are involved. For present purposes, the practice of major asylum and
refugee resettlement countries is particularly important, and Canada, the
United States of America, France, and Belgium are significant actors in the
field.
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state practice in this area has been opaque. Outside the European Court of
Human Rights, it is difficult to discern on what basis family reunification is
being granted, as it is compatible with national as well as international
imperatives.
As a final matter, an important counterargument that might be leveled
against this broad conception of refugee family reunification rights should be
addressed. It might be said that states, knowing that they will probably have to
grant entry to more family members if they grant refugee status to one person,
will be more reluctant to deem persons refugees, and therefore overall
protection of refugees will decrease as a result of this right. This argument is
empirical, and data is unavailable to confirm or discredit it; moreover, there are
reasoned arguments that allowing family reunification will not harm but rather
support the national interest by making refugee integration more effective.'46
V. CONCLUSION
Various instruments in international law recognize the right to family unity.
Because the right to family unity has been consistently recognized, directly or
indirectly, in such instruments, it is beyond doubt that such a right exists. There
is significant room for uncertainty, though, in the content of this right. One
possible expression of the right to family unity is a more specific right to family
reunification: given that a family has been separated, it could be argued, the right
to family unity implies that they are due positive efforts by the state to bring
them together in the state of the family's choosing. The jurisprudence in this
area, though, makes clear that a general right to family reunification does not
exist. However, refugees present an interesting special case for family
reunification as an expression of family unity, because the situation by which
refugees are defined necessarily implicates involuntary separation from a family
and inability to return to the country of origin. Given these unique factors that
are constitutive of refugee status, as provided in the Refugee Convention, it
would be impossible to argue that, all other things being equal, a balancing test
could find that the state's interest in controlling its borders outweighs the
refugees' right to family unity. Therefore, on the assumption that most
jurisdictions would follow a similar line or jurisprudence to the one developed in
the ECtHR, which is reasonable given its developed jurisprudence on the matter
and the absence of family reunification jurisprudence in other international
bodies, it follows that refugees have a broader right to family reunification than
the general population.
Thus, the United States' general practice of allowing family reunification for refugee families, see
Nessel, Families at Risk, supra note 43, at 1274, is persuasive.
146

See general# Wilmsen, supra note 117.
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Family reunification for refugees, of course, raises further questions as to
the extent of the rights and obligations arising out of it. What constitutes
"family" for the purposes of family reunification? That is, while it seems
uncontroversial that a child be reunited with his or her parents or two spouses
reunited, what is the state's duty to, for example, dependent grandparents? And
what efforts are required of the state to reunify families? While it may be the
case that the passive act of allowing immigration is the full extent of the state's
duty, it may also be reasonable to think that the state may be required to
perform some further positive act to reunify families, such as offering assistance
in locating scattered family members or cooperating with other governments to
ensure safe passage. These questions are beyond the scope of the Comment, but
are nonetheless interesting issues that would certainly arise in the practice of
refugee family reunification and are worthy of further examination.
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